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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU or Union) is having a hard time getting emerging countries such as 
India, Brazil and China, to open their economies to European companies. This is a problem 
because it exposes the continued discrepancy between the relatively open European single 
market, of which foreign companies can reap the fruits, and the relatively closed markets in 
emerging countries which European companies have trouble accessing. The issue has become 
especially pressing in recent years as the crisis has left Europe searching for new sources of 
growth. Gaining access to new emerging markets is one way to achieve renewed economic 
impetus. China is especially important because it is a motor for growth in these economically 
adverse times, and because of the size of its market and importance of its trade relations with 
Europe.  
With China not budging enough, Europe’s rhetoric towards China has turned increasingly 
assertive. This was visible in the 2008 Global Europe publications, of Mandelson’s cabinet of the 
Directorate General (DG) Trade, which included a specific China strategy.
1
 Europe would try to 
get China to commit to a reciprocal trade relationship (the mutual opening of markets for mutual 
benefit). Europe was also going to commit China to resolving a distinct set of trade issues such as 
infringement of intellectual property rights, the trade deficit, and its illiberal public procurement 
market. Both in the press and in the think tank world this signal was picked up as the EU 
“toughening up” on China.2 
The EU uses various tracks to get its partners to commit to the mutual opening of markets. 
Two prime examples are getting countries to accede to the World Trade Organization WTO and 
via bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). But these pathways have been less fruitful than 
initially hoped for. China’s accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) of 
the WTO has been slow. An EU-China FTA seems highly unlikely. One tool which according to 
                                                          
1
 European Commission, Global Europe: EU-China Trade and Investment Competition and Partnership (Brussels: 
European Union, 2006). 
2
 Tobias Buck in Strasbourg and Richard McGregor in Beijing, “EU Takes Tough Line with China on Trade,” Financial 
Times, October 24, 2006, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e5c45a6-637c-11db-bc82-0000779e2340.html; Simon 
J. Evenett, “Trade Policy: Time for a Rethink?,” in Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, ed. André 
Sapir (Brussels, Belgium: Bruegel, 2007), 61–93. 
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the Commission and policy analysts does have potential in increasing market access is the 
wielding of trade instruments, which by increasing the leverage of the EU over its negotiating 
partners ultimately coerce the other partners to adhere to a reciprocal trade relation.
3
 In this thesis 
I look at the development of one such trade instrument in particular; the public procurement 
instrument, which aims at regulating bids in the EU public procurement market from third 
countries. This instrument has been attributed to be the litmus test of EU’s tougher stance on 
China.
4
 
While the proposed instrument is heralded by the Commission as a market opener,
5
 the 
instrument presents third countries with the credible threat that the EU single market for public 
procurement can be closed off to bidders from third countries, should restrictive practices 
continue. Leaving aside the negative reaction this instrument is likely to cause among Europe’s 
trade partners, within Europe the proposal has been regarded by some as outright protectionism,
6
 
while others have been more receptive of it, seeing it as a signal of the EU becoming less naïve.
7
 
The issue of reciprocity and the instrument that is supposed to undergird it are political and 
subjectively laden, because at the heart of these issues lies the question of what trade policy is 
most beneficial for Europe and its partners in trade. But the aim of this project is not to discern 
the rights and wrongs of liberalism and free traderism versus protectionism and mercantilism, 
although this debate will certainly pop up from time to time. 
The development of the public procurement instrument was first announced in 2006
8
 but 
the plan was quickly shelved and did not make a public re-appearance until 2010 as part of the 
                                                          
3
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Annex to the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions -  Global Europe: Competing in the World A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy (Brussels, 
October 4, 2006), 21. 
4
 Justin Vaïsse and Hans Kundnani, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010 (Brussels: European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2011), 30; F. Godement, J. Parello-Plesner, and A. Richard, The Scramble for Europe, Policy Brief 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 7. 
5
 European Commission, “European Commission Levels the Playing Field for European Business in International 
Procurement Markets”, March 21, 2012, sec. Press Release, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/268&format=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en. 
6
 The Economist, “Unfree Trade: The European Commission Is Flirting Dangerously with Protectionism,” The 
Economist, March 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21551064. 
7
 The Economist, “Protect Trade, or Protect Sarkozy?,” Charlemagne, March 22, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/03/trade-policy-eu. 
8
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Annex to the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions -  Global Europe: Competing in the World A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, 21. 
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European Commission’s work programme for 2011.9 Then estimated to see its first proposal 
disclosed in the third quarter of 2011, it was ultimately released to the Council, the European 
Parliament, and the public at the end of the first quarter of 2012.
10
 It still has to pass the Council 
and the European Parliament. 
What I will focus on is the following conundrum; with the Commission making the 
political decision in 2006 to push hard on China (and other trade partners) to open up, to pursue 
reciprocity in trade, and to develop a new instrument in support of this principle, the development 
of the latter has been noticeably slow. Even when taking into account the possibilities for the EU 
to use other, existing forums and instruments to push for a more open public procurement market, 
it is peculiar that this instrument, while originally planned to have its first proposal in the fall of 
2006, ultimately saw this date pushed up to March 2012. 
While policy analysts claim that the EU’s inertia has to do with the fact that EU member 
states are split on how to deal with China,
11
 this does not constitute the whole picture. Even 
though diverging interests may affect the degree of support for reciprocity and the subsequent 
development of a new trade instrument, policy analysts ignore the dynamics of decision-making 
that precede policy. Disagreement between member states on external trade relations does not 
have to lead to inertia in the development of common trade policy per se. Much depends on how 
preferences are aggregated, when decisions are made, how they are made, and who makes them. 
Hence the question: 
 
Can the decision-making process explain why it took six years for the Commission to disclose a 
first proposal for a new public procurement instrument on third country access? 
To my surprise, one of the most popular theories on European decision-making, Fritz Scharpf’s 
Joint-Decision Trap (JDT) theory, has to my knowledge never been applied to decision-making 
on common trade policy. Moreover it has been scarcely applied to decision-making on European 
foreign policy in general. What makes this theory particularly suitable is that it was designed to 
                                                          
9
 European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2011 (Brussels, October 27, 2010). 
10
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Third Country 
Access to EU’s Public Procurement Market (Brussels, March 21, 2012), 2. 
11
 Godement, Parello-Plesner, and Richard, The Scramble for Europe; J. Fox and F. Godement, A Power Audit of EU-
China Relations (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009); Vaïsse and Kundnani, European Foreign Policy 
Scorecard 2010; Justin Vaïsse and Hans Kundnani, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012 (Brussels: European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). 
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explain decision-making inertia. Scharpf’s Joint-Decision Trap theory posits that the institutional 
design of the European decision-making process can unintentionally yield suboptimal outcomes 
due to “traps”; the inability to progress from the status-quo towards a new (and hopefully) more 
effective common policy. Scharpf observed that the presence and gravity of certain conditions in 
the decision-making process can increase or decrease the risk of these traps emerging. Among 
them, the degree to which interests diverge.
12
  
 
The central hypothesis of this project is that a joint decision-making trap is delaying the 
development of the public procurement instrument. I test the validity of Scharpf’s JDT theory in 
explaining the progress the instrument has made to this date (2006-2012). I conclude that JDT 
theory can explain why it took six years to turn the instrument from an agenda point into an 
official proposal. With the help of Scharpf’s JDT theory, this research has uncovered several 
bottlenecks of the decision-making process inside the Council and Commission. 
 
I draw the bulk of my findings from a combination of primary and secondary literature and 12 
interviews that I held with 14 country and EU representatives from the Commission (DG Trade 
and DG Internal Market and Services (MARKT)), the European Parliament’s (EP) International 
Trade Committee (INTA), and country representatives of the Council’s Trade Policy Committee 
(TPC).
13
 
Let me conclude this introductory chapter with the question of relevancy. What does this 
project contribute to? First regarding the theory. The application of JDT theory is warranted for 
two reasons. First, because it is a widely accepted theory for explaining decision-making traps in 
internal EU policy making. Second, because it has not been sufficiently tested on cases of 
decision-making on external EU policy. Besides its applicability as a theory explaining 
suboptimal decision-making in Europe’s internal policies, can it also explain suboptimal 
decision-making on Europe’s external policies? Not only will this research contribute to the 
theoretical debate on European decision-making, but it will also shed light on numerous factors 
                                                          
12
 Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” Public 
Administration 66, no. Autumn (1988): 239–278. 
13
 As agreed upon between the author and the interviewees, no copies of the raw data will be distributed for 
reasons of confidentiality and anonymity. Names of interviewees are known by the author. 
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contributing to suboptimal decision-making in EU foreign policy of which European policy 
makers should be aware. 
Why the case study on China and public procurement one might ask. Naturally, the public 
procurement instrument would not just target China, but all third countries with closed off public 
procurement markets. I will later explain what factors make them a highly relevant test case. To 
list them briefly; its market potential, its relevance as a trade partner for Europe, and Europe’s 
questionable success in committing China to a reciprocal trade relation via alternative channels. 
Finally, the decision-making process of EU bodies is rather opaque for outsiders, but even 
for an insider the process can seem messy. The research will shed some light on one of the 
committees of the Council; the TPC. The TPC has been noted to be rather non-transparent and 
hard to attain access to.
14
 This research will also contribute to highlighting those stages and 
factors of the decision-making process on common trade policy which particularly affect the 
decision-making pace and hence may enable policy makers to find ways to make the process 
more time-efficient. 
 
In the following chapter I will review the most commonly heard argument for why the EU has 
not been able to develop the public procurement instrument sooner. In the subsequent chapters I 
will then place this debate of a divided Europe inside the theoretical framework of the Joint-
Decision Trap model. After developing the hypotheses there is a lengthy chapter on case 
selection. Besides serving as a justification for the relevance of China and public procurement as 
a test case, the chapter also provides much needed contextual insights. I hope it helps the reader 
understand how the instrument relates to the bigger picture of EU-China relations. The final two 
chapters are for the results, conclusion, and discussion. 
  
                                                          
14
 Evenett, “Trade Policy: Time for a Rethink?,” 65; Manfred Elsig, “European Union Trade Policy After Enlargement: 
Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and Informal Decision-making,” Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 6 (2010): 
790. 
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2. Is a Divided Europe Slowing Down the 
Decision-making Process? 
 
While Europe has been hammering on the need for a reciprocal trade relationship with China and 
other trade partners since 2006 (if not longer), no additional reciprocity inducing instruments 
were created until 2012. According to ECFR the main reason for this inertia is that EU member 
states are split on China; all following their own China doctrine, some having no China strategy 
at all, but none really paying heed to how their behavior affects the common EU line on China. 
Because not every country is affected equally by the political and economic sway of the Chinese, 
and because some member states (especially the big three: Germany, France, the UK) prefer to 
strike deals directly with the Chinese, rather than through the Commission, common European 
trade policy the unites EU member states only at face value.15 China knows very well how it can 
exploit the division that exists within Europe and also prefers dealing with member states directly 
rather than via Brussels. 
A study by the Bruegel think tank, looking at public opinion data, demonstrated that trade 
issues scores relatively high in terms of interest heterogeneity across member states. While it is 
one of the issues where Europe is most divided on, ironically it is also an area that would benefit 
most from a common approach (and rightly so has been the first and most supranational 
competence of the EU).16 One must seriously question whether much pride or assurance should 
be taken from the claim that the EU stands “united in diversity” because it makes the EU an 
incoherent negotiating partner.
17
 Some argue that internal division on trade issues is in fact a 
strength; 
 
“By being divided internally but united through the collective representation requirement, 
the EU has been able to obtain more in international trade negotiations than it might have if 
                                                          
15
 Fox and Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations; Vaïsse and Kundnani, European Foreign Policy 
Scorecard 2010; Vaïsse and Kundnani, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012; Godement, Parello-Plesner, and 
Richard, The Scramble for Europe. 
16
 Benoît Coeuré and Jean Pisani-Ferry, “The Governance of the European Union’s International Economic 
Relations: How Many Voices?,” in Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy (Brussels: Bruegel, 2007), 
21–60. 
17
 Parello-Plesner, Engaging China: EU on the Path Towards Reciprocity with a Global Power, 271. 
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all decisions had been made through strict majority voting and with a lot of flexibility 
granted to European negotiators.”
18
 
 
Although this internal division might be to Europe’s advantage in some bilateral or multilateral 
forums, this might be less so when dealing with China. In fact, the reviewed studies suggests 
quite the opposite. Internal division may in fact not be beneficial at all when an increasingly 
assertive trade partner knows how to play the game of divide and conquer. Even though the EU 
has strong competences in trade, individual member states are found to obstruct the EU’s 
common trade policy by pursuing their own interests. 
So what are the economic fault lines within Europe on China? Two ECFR studies (2009 
and 2012) are of particular interest because they ranked EU member states according to their 
economic and political attitude towards China. The economic dimensions are most of interest 
here. The first dimension (from the 2009 study) ranks countries according to an average 
consisting of their voting behavior on anti-dumping issues with China, their position on the trade 
deficit with China, their attitude towards Chinese investments in Europe.
19
  
The second dimension (from the 2011 study), positions countries along an axis according 
to the aggregate of positions taken on their core market of interest in relation to China (whether 
they prioritize market access in China, or favor Chinese investments in Europe), the country’s 
stance towards Chinese investment and bond purchases, and their support for a public 
procurement instrument.
20
 See figure 1. 
This visualization and the labels should be read with caution; measurements were taken at 
two different points in time (interests constantly change), the dimensions have some overlap 
(market access concerns and market ideology are related), and the they both represent the 
aggregate of positions on a range of economic (and trade related) issues which do not easily add 
up. Nevertheless, a few useful observations can be made. With this in mind, the table reveals that 
among the EU member states there are protectionists and free traders, and that some are eager to 
pry open Chinese markets while others are more interested in attracting Chinese investments. 
 
  
                                                          
18
 Meunier and Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power,” 909. 
19
 Fox and Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, 3–4. 
20
 Godement, Parello-Plesner, and Richard, The Scramble for Europe, 9. 
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Figure 1. Country positions 
Before the crisis (2008-2009) 
Countries ranked from liberal to protectionist 
After the crisis (2010-2011) 
Countries ranked from favoring access to  China to 
favoring Chinese deals in Europe 
Liberal 
 
Netherland 
Sweden, UK 
Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Estonia, Malta 
Lithuania, Austria 
Latvia 
Finland 
Czech Republic, Hungary 
Cyprus, Slovenia 
Germany 
Access to China 
 
 
 
France  
 
Germany 
UK 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
 
Bulgaria 
Slovakia, Romania 
France, Greece 
Poland 
Portugal 
Italy 
Spain 
 
 
 
Protectionist 
Italy  
Finland, Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Czech Republic, Austria, Portugal, Cyprus 
Belgium, Greece 
Latvia 
Ireland, Lithuania, Spain 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Romania 
Poland, Malta, Bulgaria, Hungary 
 
Chinese investments 
 
Sources: Fox and Godement (2009) “A power audit of EU-China relations”; Godement, Parello-Plesner, and Richard 
(2011) “The Scramble for Europe” 
 
It is argued that the current crisis has further exacerbated this division. Some member states 
remain concerned about market access in China, while others become increasingly dependent on 
Chinese investments.21 According to Godement et al. we now have a division between “frustrated 
market openers”, consisting of the Northern free traders of Europe (Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark, United Kingdom) Germany and France, and the “cash-strapped deal seekers” 
consisting mainly of Eastern and Southern European member states.
22
 The former want access to 
China but not all want it under the condition of reciprocity or via the imposition of trade 
instruments. The latter look to China for easy money but are also more concerned about their 
                                                          
21
 Godement, Parello-Plesner, and Richard, The Scramble for Europe. 
22
 Ibid., 7–8. 
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declining economic competitiveness vis-à-vis the Chinese; they are moderately (but not all) in 
favor of reciprocity and the public procurement instrument. 
While Chinese inward investment in Europe is steadily growing and expected to continue 
on that trajectory, it has historically been so insignificant
23
 that Chinese money per se is not going 
to split the EU much. However, the discrepancy between the relatively open EU single market 
and the many obstructions of the Chinese market is likely to strike a chord. 
To the Northern European countries, who are still convinced that their superior products 
(Germany) might ultimately grant them access to Chinese markets, who depend largely on trade 
and transport (The Netherlands) and are typically well integrated into the global economy 
(Scandinavian countries, UK, NL, Germany), or who uphold the free-trade ideology (The United 
Kingdom), market access barriers are frustrating, but may ultimately not warrant the use of any 
trade instruments (the word de facto itself implies some form of steering) because they are 
convinced that unfettered and open markets are better markets, even if external parties might not 
immediately follow suit. To countries for whom China is a relatively unimportant trading partner 
(Spain, Belgium), who boast fewer companies that can rival their Chinese competitors (Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria), or where the mercantilist and protectionist discord has historically 
found more support (France, Italy), the wielding of trade instruments may enjoy greater 
support.
24
 
Two other ECFR reports sought to gauge Europe’s ability to leverage reciprocal behavior 
in the public procurement. With regard to how well the EU has handled the promotion of 
reciprocal access to public procurement in Europe and China ECFR’s Vaïsse and Kundnani paint 
a sobering picture. Their European Foreign Policy Scorecard, which annually assesses how well 
the EU has dealt with various foreign policy issues gave the EU a C for applying reciprocity to 
improve market access to public procurement in Europe and China for the year 2011, which 
constituted a downgrade from a C+ in 2010. In terms of unity found among members for this 
policy the EU scored a 2/5 in 2011, down from a 4/5 in 2010. In terms of the resources which the 
EU has made available for this policy it scored a 2/5 for both years. And on outcome it received a 
                                                          
23
 Jamil Anderlini in Beijing, “Chinese Investment in Europe to Surge,” Financial Times, October 26, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/44b70836-ffde-11e0-89ce-00144feabdc0.html. 
24
 Fox and Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, 5–7; Godement, Parello-Plesner, and Richard, The 
Scramble for Europe, 7–8. 
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4/10 in 2011, up from a 3/10.
25
 Naturally the approach cannot avoid a reasonable degree of 
subjectivity even if the scoring is done by experts. This is acknowledged by ECFR.
26
 
According to this narrative divisions among member states is withholding the EU from 
coercing China to open up. However, the reviewed ECFR studies provide an incomplete causal 
explanation. Antagonism in itself does not necessarily have to lead to deadlock in decision-
making. This depends much on how decisions are made, how they are framed, and who can make 
them; i.e. dynamics of the decision-making process at large matter. 
 
  
                                                          
25
 Vaïsse and Kundnani, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010, 28–32; Vaïsse and Kundnani, European Foreign 
Policy Scorecard 2012, 26–33. 
26
 http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/methodology/ 
11 
 
3. Discussion of the Joint-Decision Trap 
Theory 
 
Scharpf’s Joint-Decision Trap theory posits that the institutional design of the EU decision-
making process can unintentionally yield suboptimal outcomes due to “traps”; the inability to 
progress from the status-quo towards a new (and hopefully) more effective common policy. The 
inertia behind the public procurement instrument could be one such example. Scharpf observed 
that the presence and gravity of certain conditions in the decision-making process can increase or 
decrease the likelihood of these traps emerging. Among them, the degree to which interests 
diverge (heterogeneity). 
The theory proved to be a very welcome addition to the academic debate and research on 
the impact of institutions on decision-making and, more specifically, decision-making in the 
European Union. Surprisingly, the theory has largely if not solely been applied to European 
decision-making traps in intra-European legislation and policy-making, of which “The EU’s 
Decision Traps: Comparing Policies” by Falkner is the latest addition.27 The book does provide 
plenty of case studies on decision-making traps on internal policies of the European Union and 
just one case study of EU’s foreign and Security Policy. 
Scharpf himself and Moravcsik have also used the theory as a nuanced critique on the EU 
democratic deficit, stemming from the difficulty of balancing market liberalization and social 
protection across the European Union. Issues of trade and global markets and the delegation of 
control over external trade policy are naturally closely related to this problem.
28
 But thus far there 
has been little interest in testing the merits of JDT theory in explaining decision-making on 
external trade policy. Although external trade policy might be an exclusive competence of the 
European Commission, it still relies on the consent of the Council who represents the European 
member states. It remains subject to the agreement or disagreement of 27 member states. 
This inward-looking tendency may be the legacy of the time-period during which Scharpf 
constructed his theory. Compared to the succeeding decades, the European Union was far less 
                                                          
27
 Gerda Falkner, The EU’s Decision Traps: Comparing Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
28
 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State,” Journal of European Public Policy 4, 
no. 1 (January 1997): 18–36; A. Moravcsik, “In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union’,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 603–624. 
12 
 
active in extra-European fields. Hence research on JDTs in European foreign policy might have 
seemed less warranted at the time. 
The reluctance to apply JDT to deficiencies in European external policy might also have to 
do with the fact that despite diverging interests between the original member states on trade 
issues,
29
 this group was still small and homogenous compared to the conditions after the rapid 
eastward EU enlargement. Since then, trade interests have become more plural and the decision-
making process more informal. Compared to the pre-2004 and 2007 enlargement, Elsig finds that 
protectionist sentiment has grown relative to liberal sentiment, but that despite the growth in the 
number of actors, the Commission’s position has not weakened, and that larger trading nations 
have gained in decision-making power relative to smaller member states because the latter are 
less accustomed and less well equipped to engage in informal modes of decision-making.
30
 
 
So what are the central tenets and independent variables of the theory? JDT theory departs from 
the observation that European legislation depends on the unanimous or near unanimous 
agreement among veto-players.
31
 Given this particularly high threshold, policy making 
sometimes stalls because no agreement is reached.
32
 Veto-players are individual or collective 
actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo.
33
 In this case, the member state 
representatives in the Council, the DGs of the Commission, the MEPs. These veto-players have 
to collectively surpass a very high agreement threshold in order to attain a common European 
policy. The effect of the agreement threshold is the first of seven determinants of the JDT. 
Second, the graveness of the JDT depends on the number veto-players involved in the 
decision-making process; the greater the number of veto-players, the greater the number of 
agreeing parties required for a policy proposal to pass.
34
 The greater the number of participants, 
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 Woolcock, “Trade Policy: A Further Shift Towards Brussels,” 391. 
30
 Elsig, “European Union Trade Policy After Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and Informal Decision-
making.” 
31
 Near unanimous decision-making inside the EU takes the form of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), in which 
member state voting power is weighted by population size. Currently 258 out of 345 votes (74%) and over 50% of 
the member states are required to vote in favor for a proposal to pass by QMV. 
32
 Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration.” 
33
 George Tsebelis, “Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, 
Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science 25 (1995): 289–326. 
34
 Fritz W. Scharpf, “The JDT Model: Context and Extensions,” in The EU’s Decision Traps, ed. Gerda Falkner (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 222. 
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the greater the number of parties which have to be included to reach a majority, and the higher 
the number of interests which have to be entertained in the majority group. 
Third, the difficulty of finding a common agreement will increase as the degree of 
heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the interests of veto-players increases.
35
 Alternatively, a 
high sense of common interests, common values and norms can help participants escape the JDT. 
A sense of commonality can be fostered through internal or external threat perception; 
 
“the perception of a common vulnerability may be derived not only from the exposure to 
external military or economic threats, but also from the living memory of fratricidal internal 
conflicts (…)”
36
 
 
Commonality of interests may also grow over time through continued interaction between actors 
or via changes of government. Georgakakis, Mangenot and Rowell find evidence that European 
(supranational) civil servants create a powerful self-censorship of national interests at the EU 
level, although the adherence to national interests is found to vary across job-functions, with the 
most senior positions being the least sensitive to self-censorship.
37
 The ongoing policy debates in 
the EU can also induce a strategy of mutual cooperation among initially antagonistic actors. 
Moreover their ongoing interaction can have a socializing effect which fosters behavior informed 
by a logic of appropriateness among actors.
38
 Empirical research on the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives found evidence of the presence of such a socialization process.
39
 Alternatively, 
changing national governments can change the degree of heterogeneity, and can either further or 
weaken the common mindset of EU.
40
 
Fourth, the compulsory negotiation system of the European Union inhibits the ability of 
individual actors (member states) to return to the zero base of individual action. This creates the 
                                                          
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration,” 261. 
37
 Didier Georgakakis, Michel Mangenot, and Jay Rowell, “European Civil Servants,” in The Palgrave Dictionary of 
Transnational History, ed. Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009). 
38
 Guy B. Peters, “Escaping the Joint-decision Trap: Repetition and Sectoral Politics in the European Union,” West 
European Politics 20, no. 2 (1997): 22–27. 
39
 Jeffrey Lewis, “The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union,” 
International Organization 59, no. Fall (2005): 937–971. 
40
 Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative Political 
Studies 51, no. 1 (1996): 123–163. 
14 
 
“trap” which is also known as Ostrom’s reversion rule.41 Once the initial agreement to coordinate 
a common policy has been reached, actors cannot defect from the initial agreement. As actors 
cannot or have no incentive to return to the default condition of individual action, because of the 
gains made by the initial agreement, due to the emergence of new self-interested institutions such 
as “eurocrats”,42 or because defection is costly due to legal constraints, they are collectively stuck 
on a suboptimal policy agreement.
43
 This trap results in “frustration without disintegration, 
resilience without progress.”44 Note that the model does not necessarily contradict Selck’s finding 
that legislative decision-making in the EU is in fact relatively free from stasis. Selck finds that the 
dominant picture is not one of inertia but one of change.”45 Indeed, agreements can be made, 
common laws and policies might be passed. However, the passing of legislation says very little 
about their Pareto optimality. 
The fifth variable is the degree to which Coasean conditions are satisfied. The Coase 
theorem posits that in the absence of a benevolent and omniscient dictator, self-interested 
individual actors can still achieve all potential welfare gains (i.e. the Pareto optimum), provided 
that there are no transaction costs, and there are sufficient side payments and package deals 
available.
46
 But in reality individual actors do face transaction costs, and side payments or 
package deals are not always available. Hence individual actors will sometimes fail to coordinate 
the most optimal policy package, “theoretically in comparison to the Coasean welfare optimum, 
and in practice when compared to the recommendations of public-interest oriented policy 
analyses.”47 
Sixth, Scharpf distinguishes between three modes of European governance, each having a 
different effect on the risk of deadlock; the intergovernmental mode, the joint-decision mode 
(also known as the community method), and the supranational-hierarchical mode. 
Intergovernmental and joint-decision making enables veto-players to exercise their vote and 
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hence force other veto-players to take into account their interests.
48
 Intergovernmental decision-
making is more susceptible to deadlocks than joint-decision making because the Commission 
does not possess the exclusive right of initiative and the 27 member states of the Council have 
greater decision-making power. 
Besides the Commission’s monopoly on the right of initiative, the community method is 
also characterized by qualified majority voting in the Council, a more active role for the 
European Parliament in co-legislating with the Council, and the European Court of Justice 
ensuring the uniformity of interpretation of Community law. The role of the Commission in this 
setup may alleviate the trap: 
 
“In all-channel negotiations between (N) veto-players, each of whom is trying to protect (a) 
salient concerns, one would need [N · (N–1) · a2] bilateral examinations of policy impacts in 
order to identify potentially consensual policy choices. However, if solutions could be 
proposed by a single, central agent, that agent would need to explore only (N · a) policy 
impacts to develop a win-win solution which (if the solution space is not empty!) should be 
acceptable to all veto-players.  
In the real world, this possibility of “intelligent design” may allow the Commission to 
present creative proposals that go beyond the trivial exploitation of fixed policy preferences 
suggested by the role of the agenda-setter in spatial voting theories. Relying on extensive 
consultations with interest groups, national and sub-national officials and independent 
experts, the Commission may be able to assess the hardness or pliability of the interests and 
constraints defended by all member governments, and to develop innovative win-win 
solutions which – though departing from the initial policy preferences of some or all veto-
players – may still be preferred to the status quo by all (or at least a qualified majority of) 
member governments and a majority in the European Parliament.”
49
 
 
Hence, optimal solutions might be more visible and easier attainable when using the community 
method because of the exclusive competences of the Commission and the overview it posesses of 
the common interests at stake. 
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The least amount of deadlock can be expected in supranational-hierarchical decision-
making. Due to the binding character of EU law, the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice act in tandem as Scharpf’s benevolent and omniscient dictator, who (ideally) is able to 
select and dictate the most optimal policy package for all, while excluding particularistic interests 
that might otherwise weaken the deal. In the supranational-hierarchical mode European member 
state governments have no direct say in the decision-making process, nor does the process 
involve (near) unanimity voting. When constructing his JDT theory in the 1980s, Scharpf was 
initially unconvinced that the EU might harbor institutions that deserve the supranational label.
50
 
Somewhat embarrassed that he had only considered the impact of the intergovernmental and 
joint-decision mode on JDTs, Scharpf later argued that “the combination of judicial legislation 
and the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiatives was able to increase the effectiveness of 
European policy-making far beyond the constraints discussed in the joint-decision trap.”51 
Lastly, later scholarship highlighted the need to take into account non-political forms of 
decision making. Policy making at the EU level does not always take the form of grand political 
bargains.
52
 Rather, policy decisions may be made by “a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”53 This style of decision-making can alleviate the 
severity of the JDT because pragmatic and technocratic problem solving shapes the policy design 
rather than political bargaining. The following diagram (figure 2) helps clarify the conditions of 
the JDT theory. 
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Figure 2. Stylized conditions of JDT theory 
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4. Operationalization of Hypotheses 
 
I first provide seven general hypotheses. Next, the theory is integrated into the institutional 
design of the decision-making process of EU common trade policy, concrete hypotheses are 
constructed which are applicable to and worth testing on the decision-making process on EU’s 
common trade policy. 
 
The central hypothesis of this project is that a joint decision-making trap is delaying the 
development of the public procurement instrument. 
 
This conjecture is backed up by seven hypotheses, each addressing one of the seven reviewed 
factors. 
 
H1 High agreement threshold; the decision-making process requires such a high agreement threshold 
that a majority is not attained or compromise is needed in order to get a sufficient number of parties to 
agree. The agreement threshold may be so high (i.e. unanimity) that the decision-making pace slows 
down or stalls completely. 
 
H2 High number of veto-players; so many veto-players are able to partake in the decision-making 
process that there are too many particularistic interests that have to be satisfied in order to gain a 
majority. The size of the veto-player crowd makes it hard to seek out the policy for which there is 
sufficient support. The effect is similar to H1; non agreement. 
 
H3 Heterogeneous interests and weak socialization process; the interests of veto-players are too diverse 
(heterogeneous), nor does veto-player interaction lead to the subordination of these particularistic 
interests to the prevailing sense of a common interest that has to be attained. The self-interestedness of 
veto-players is so strong that they fail to agree on a policy that is acceptable to a majority and has the 
highest aggregate pay-off. Compromise does not necessarily lead to the most effective policy solution 
unless a problem-solving mentality, in which the common interest prevails, is predominantly on the 
minds of the veto-players. 
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H4 Compulsory negotiation system; veto-players are unable or unwilling to defect from the current 
policy making institution because non-cooperation is less effective than the current level of 
cooperation, or defection is too costly (e.g. penalty by law or weaker unilateral policy). In other words, 
non-cooperation yields even less effective or less efficient policy solutions. 
 
H5 Non-satisfaction of Coasean conditions; transaction costs are too high, and side payments and/or 
package deals are unavailable for veto-players. Even if the most optimal common policy solution is 
clearly visible to all veto-players, those veto-players for whom the cost-benefit ratio is not in their 
favor and for which no compensatory package can be devised will refuse to select this solution. 
 
H6 Little/no supranational decision-making; In the decision-making process, there is no superior party 
which, guarding the common interests at stake, and having a thorough overview and comprehension of 
the prevailing individual interests, is able to recognize the most optimal policy solution and coerce the 
other parties to follow this line. 
 
H7 Politicized agenda; the issue that has to be decided upon cannot be dealt with in strictly technical 
terms. The issue at stake is complicated due to an increase in the number of (politicized) reservations 
of veto-players. This slows down the decision-making process because it is harder to reconcile the 
differences. 
 
4.1. The Decision-making Process of Common Trade Policy 
 
How do these hypotheses relate to the decision-making process for common trade policy and how 
can they be operationalized? The decision-making process involves the Commission, the Council, 
and the European Parliament. Trade policy is decided upon via the community method meaning 
that the Commission has the right of initiative and has to get the approval of the Council and the 
EP for the proposal to become a regulation. Besides a request from the Council, as of December 
1
st
 2009 the EP can also request the Commission to create a proposal.
54
 In the EP the 
International Trade Committee (INTA) plays the most important role, because all trade (policy) 
reports are drafted by this committee. The Commission staff, even though serving a supranational 
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institution, are swayed by national and policy-specific interests.
55
 The same can be expected from 
the MEPs and naturally the country representatives in the Council. 
The Commission is typically granted greater leeway in dealing with detailed and technical 
topics, than when handling politically sensitive issues. Hence there is a tug of war between the 
Commission on one hand, seeking to keep the discussion technical, and the member states on the 
other, who via their representation in the Council, will seek to politicize issues when they want to 
gain more say over the issue at hand.
56
 This is one of the reasons why the Commission often tries 
to communicate no more than strictly necessary, as the more information provided, the higher the 
chance is that the other veto players find ways to politicize the proposal. Another strategy to 
increase the Commission’s sway is to send out the negotiation agenda for the TPC at the latest 
moment possible, so the member-state representatives have little time to prepare.
57
 
The public procurement instrument is a joint-proposal of DG Trade and DG MARKT. 
Besides close cooperation between the two initiators, the other DGs will be able to have their say 
on the proposal during a process called the interservice consultation. The other DGs will want the 
initiating DGs to create a proposal which preferably contributes to the propagation of their 
interests in their specific area of competence, or at the very least ensure that it does not run 
counter to it.
58
 Although the initiating DGs are not obliged to take aboard all demands, the 
interservice consultation is nevertheless an important stage in the process. More so because 
ultimately the proposal will have to pass in the cabinet meeting where unanimity is typically 
preferred. 
Once the Commission has come to a proposal it then puts the proposal to the Council and 
the EP. The Council then has the proposal scrutinized by its TPC, composed of national trade 
officials. National trade officials seek to get the proposal in line with national interests. Formally, 
the Council will have to decide on the proposal by QMV. But where possible the TPC favors 
reaching a consensus (unanimity) among member states. Once a decision has been made, the 
TPC informs the Commission of any amendments it would like to see. Although the Commission 
is not obliged to take into account member state interests, it is nevertheless in the Commission’s 
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interest to have their consent before it proposes an agenda to the Council because it will increase 
the likelihood that the agenda will get accepted without the TPC demanding revision. 
Coincidentally with the Council, the European Parliament also debates the proposal. Via 
committee discussions lead by INTA and subsequent readings in the European Parliament, the 
proposal is likely to face amendments before it comes down to a final vote. Once both the 
Council and the EP have passed the proposal it is then up to the Commission to implement it. 
Despite the necessary input from other DGs and the EP, the “central dynamic of EU trade lies in 
the interaction between the Commission and the Council/Article 133 Committee [author: now 
known as the TPC]”.59 This dynamic was reconfirmed by practitioners inside the Commission 
and the TPC;
A1, A2
 Nevertheless, the EP has steadily seen its influence expanded under 
subsequent European treaties. The most significant addition (as of December 2009) and the one 
most if interest is that after Lisbon the Council and the European Parliament have to agree on the 
text of the first reading. Only once both sides agree on the content of the first reading can 
discussion on the proposal move forward inside both institutions. The EU legislative process has 
become more bicameral. Since Lisbon the EP is also able to ask the Commission to draft new 
legislation. 
This overview has sketched a rather linear decision-making path, but in reality this model is 
not as clear cut; there will be numerous (informal) exchanges between the Commission and the 
Council and between the Commission and the European Parliament before the official proposal is 
released. This informal bargaining is known as the “trialogue”. “The purpose of these contacts is 
to get agreement on a package of amendments acceptable to the Council and the European 
Parliament. The Commission’s endorsement is particularly important, in view of the fact that, if it 
opposes an amendment which the European Parliament wants to adopt, the Council will have to 
act unanimously to accept that amendment. Any agreement in trilogies [sic] is informal and "ad 
referendum" and will have to be approved by the formal procedures applicable within each of the 
three institutions.”60 
Also there are more actors involved than just the Commission, Council and EP. The fact 
that any regulation requires public consultation and an impact assessment by the Commission’s 
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Impact Assessment Board (AIB) should not be ignored. But strictly speaking they are not veto-
players in Scharpf’s theory; while their input matters, they ultimately cannot block the proposal. 
 
 
Figure 3. EU decision-making process on EU common trade policy after Lisbon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
 
It is now possible to relate these hypotheses to the inertia of the EU to embed the principle of 
reciprocity in its trade instruments. Hypotheses are presented in the order of the decision-making 
process unless specified otherwise; EP, Commission, Council. 
 
High agreement threshold 
While the EP votes by simple majority, the Commission prefers to work by unanimity and the 
Council formally votes by QMV. 
HI: The preference for unanimous decision-making inside the Commission has delayed the 
drafting of the public procurement instrument. 
European Council/European Parliament *,** 
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HII:  The QMV threshold in the Council’s TPC delayed the development of the public 
procurement instrument since 2006. 
HIII: The simple majority threshold delayed the EP’s request to the Commission to apply the 
reciprocity principle to the EU’s common trade policy and is likely to slow down the 
drafting of the public procurement instrument. 
 
High # of veto players 
While one would think this to be more of an issue for the EP (754 MEPs) and the TPC (27 
member states), the Commission is no monolith either. The decision-making structure of the 
Commission suggests that the Commission may also be  swayed by difference among its internal 
groupings (DGs, units). 
HIV: The high number of veto players in the Commission is slowing down the drafting of the 
public procurement instrument. 
HV: The high number of veto players in the TPC delayed the development of the public 
procurement instrument. 
HVI:  The high number of veto players in the EP delayed the request to the Commission to apply 
the reciprocity principle to the EU’s common trade policy and is likely to slow down the 
drafting of the public procurement instrument. 
 
 
Heterogeneity of interests, socialization process 
JDT theory posits that 1) when the interests of EU member states widely diverge the institutional 
design of the decision-making process may create deadlock but 2) that a socialization process 
may subdue the prevalence of state interests in favor of the common European interest. 
HVII) The Commission has been divided on the development of the public procurement 
instrument. A socialization process among the DGs and units has lessened this divide so 
that over time it has mustered enough support to propose the public procurement 
instrument. 
HVIII) The Council has been divided on the reciprocity principle and the public procurement 
instrument, hence holding up the development of a public procurement instrument. In 
general, the socialization process among country representatives is not strong enough to 
overcome their disagreement. 
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HIX)  Division and a weak socialization process in the European Parliament has delayed the 
request to the Commission to apply the reciprocity principle to the EU’s common trade 
policy and is likely to slow down the drafting of the public procurement instrument. 
 
Supranational decision-making 
European trade policy is decided upon using the community method. Hence the Commission has 
greater sway because it has the exclusive right of initiative. The Commission would then be in a 
better position to select the policy package it deems most beneficial to the EU at large and is most 
likely to see its way through Council and Parliament. Naturally if the Commission and the 
Council are more or less in agreement that more reciprocity and a public procurement instrument 
are unwanted, then the degree of supranational decision-making is irrelevant. Hence this 
hypothesis is only relevant if no support for HVIII can be found. 
HX) Despite the right of initiative and the ability to oversee the field of interests, the 
Commission has had trouble in gathering enough support for the public procurement 
instrument so that the proposal could not be made before March 2012. 
 
Politicized agenda 
Once a proposal becomes a fight over ideological, political, or country-specific interests, it 
becomes even harder to pass. The overall effect is a complication of the issue; more barriers and 
reservations will have to be dealt with, leading to a slowdown in the decision-making process. 
HXI) The discussion in the Commission on reciprocity and the public procurement instrument is 
inherently political, slowing down the development of a public procurement instrument. 
HXII) The discussion in the Council on reciprocity and the public procurement instrument is 
inherently political, slowing down the development of a public procurement instrument. 
HXIII) The discussion in the EP on reciprocity and the public procurement instrument is 
inherently political, slowing down the development of a public procurement instrument. 
 
Finally, there are two hypotheses that will not be tested any further; the degree to which the 
negotiation on common trade policy is compulsory, and the degree to which economic trade-offs 
are possible (Coasean conditions). Let me explain why. 
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Compulsory negotiation 
The presence of this condition can more or less be taken for granted and hence will not be 
included in the final analysis. It can be inferred from the ongoing participation of all EU member 
states in the decision-making process inside the Couincil and EP, that they have no intention of 
discarding European trade policy for a national trade policy. Should any country want to do so, it 
would have to leave the European Single Market. There is no evidence for this. Rather the past 
decade has seen a record number of countries gaining EU membership. Despite the possibility 
that they are dissatisfied with aspects of the European trade policy, member states nevertheless 
favor the continuation of a common external trade policy over a strictly national one. 
 For those who argue that especially the larger member states prefer to deal with China 
directly, and therefore there is besides a European element also a national element to foreign 
trade policy,
61
 this does not negate the fact that all member states remain engaged in the 
negotiations on common trade policy. 
 
Coasean conditions 
The validity of the Coasean conditions will not be tested for the reason that common policies for 
an economically diverse set of member states will logically affect countries differently and 
compensation is complicated to bring about. While some EU officials and member states may be 
convinced that reciprocity and the proposed trade instrument will benefit the EU as a whole, 
others expect such a policy will not be in their interest. But there are very few effective 
compensatory mechanisms available to compensate those countries opposed to reciprocity. 
There are clear discrepancies across the economic ecosystem of European member states. 
Some are well positioned to reap the benefits of a globalized economy because they are global 
traders (The Netherlands), make unrivalled high end products (Germany), are strongly integrated 
in the world economy and convinced of the benefits of free-trade (the North). Other nations 
(typically the South and East) are traditionally more protectionist and have less competitive 
firms. So countries naturally have different cost-benefit calculations regarding the procurement 
instrument. Some might be more affected by protectionist retaliation from trade partners than 
other states. Some EU member might see the proposal as a job-saver, while others expect 
procurement costs to rise in a time of government austerity.  
                                                          
61
 Fox and Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations. 
26 
 
Incurred costs due to the public procurement instrument will also be hard, if not impossible, 
to compensate. First of all, should China, or any other state, respond to Europe’s new instrument 
by imposing protectionist measures, then there is slim chance any company or country suffering 
from market closure can prove the EU public procurement instrument is to blame. And should it 
find such a link it seems unlikely that entity would receive compensation for incurred costs. 
Second, Northern European States oppose reciprocity as a principle. Their fundamental 
opposition makes it unlikely that they will be swayed by any compensatory mechanism. 
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5. Data Collection and Method of Analysis 
 
While relying on primary (mainly EU documents) and secondary textual sources (news, prior 
research), the majority of my findings are based on 12 interviews held with 14 country and EU 
representatives from the Commission (DG Trade and DG Internal Market and Services 
(MARKT)), the European Parliament’s (EP) International Trade Committee (INTA), and country 
representatives of the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) during the first half of 2012. All individuals 
that I spoke with were carefully selected for their expertise on the matters of interest. They are 
knowledgeable of European trade policy, and sometimes public procurement and EU-China 
relations in particular, and have been involved at different stages of the decision-making process 
between 2006 and 2012. So the evidence comes from the most authoritative sources in the field. 
See the appendix for a complete overview of the interviewees. 
Because the interservice consultation process and the TPC meetings are not open to 
public, the public minutes or agendas that do get published are not very detailed, and because the 
decision-making process naturally involves plenty of undocumented informal decision-making 
encounters, the interviews were the most important and most effective data-collection tool. 
 
As outlined above, several conditions can contribute to the emergence of a JDT. But the theory 
does not state general conditions of necessity and sufficiency. Nor does there have to be support 
for all hypotheses in order to conclude with reasonable certainty that a JDT has or is slowing 
down the adoption of the public procurement instrument. For example, the roadblock could lie in 
the Commission or in the Council, or between the two institutions, and it might be caused by the 
heterogeneity of interests or because the high number of veto-players. In the next chapter I will 
first expand on the relevance of China and the public procurement market. Then in the 
subsequent chapter the findings of the interviews and study of EU documents will be presented in 
the form of a actor by actor chronological narrative. Here I first analyze what others have 
observed to be Europe’s changing tone on China, I then explain the central tenets of the public 
procurement instrument, and then look at the developments inside the Commission, among 
countries, and inside the Council and European Parliament. This is done for easy reading and it 
provides the best overview of the process. Lastly I turn to what this narrative implies for the 
hypotheses. 
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Finally to desensitize some potential criticisms. First, it might be argued that because this 
approach does not explicitly test any hypotheses that rival those of the JDT model, my research 
will not provide alternative insights besides what the JDT model states as relevant. By looking 
across time and by cross referencing the claims of the interviewees, I will be able to sufficiently 
test various explanations and uncover any relevant causal paths that fall within or outside of the 
JDT model. 
Second and related to the first point, it could be argued that 13 hypotheses cannot be 
sufficiently tested via a dozen interviews. Because there is the possibility to ask open ended 
questions, and commencing the interview with “what do you think” questions, in order to not bias 
interviewees towards only considering JDT theory. I agree however, that a greater number of 
interviewees would be conducive to the accuracy of the results, but given budget and time 
constraints, I believe a reasonable balance has been struck between the number of questions and 
available sources. 
Third, this no or minimal variance approach might cause some to question how this 
research method can uncover whether the presence or absence of certain independent variables 
really affects the decision-making process and how widely this applies. To this I answer that this 
would apply for all qualitative JDT research; each decision-making process involves different 
actors even if the label (e.g. Commission) remains the same, and brings together different 
preference groups. So my findings might not easily be extrapolated to other proposals for EU 
regulation. But at a higher level this research can help determine whether JDT theory can also be 
applied to the decision-making common external policies, rather than just common internal 
policies. 
A fourth criticism would be that the current design looks solely at EU decision-making 
between member state representatives and supranational bodies. But in the end, EU legislation is 
supposed to work for the European public; for individuals and their companies. Why does this 
research exclude from its theoretical framework the influence which private enterprise, the public 
consultation round, and the Impact Assessment Board might have on the decision-making 
process? The main reason is that Scharpf’s theoretical framework does not account for these 
actors are not veto-players. Research has also shown that “EU policymaking as it pertains to 
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external trade is quite insulated from general public pressures.”62 Moreover, it is already fairly 
ambitious to uncover the decision-making process across the Commission, Council, and EP. For 
the sake of parsimony additional actors were not included. I invite others to see how these other 
actors would impact the decision-making process. 
Fifth, the heightened attention to the reciprocity principle and the public procurement 
instrument cover a time of institutional reform in the European Union; the Lisbon Treaty. Should 
the research design not distinguish more clearly between the pre and post-Lisbon decision-
making structure? The two biggest changes both relate to the EP; it has gained the right to request 
the Commission to draft a proposal, and the bicameral structure between the EP and the Council. 
The first change has been accounted for in the EP hypotheses. Regarding the latter, the public 
procurement instrument is not at this stage yet; the first reading will occur after the summer of 
2012 at earliest. 
A final criticism is that this qualitative analysis cannot give an indication of the gravity of 
variables; it may tell you whether or not variables matter, but it cannot tell you to what degree 
they matter. This is a limitation we will have to live with. I believe the validity of the JDT model 
can best be tested using a qualitative approach. Especially because the phenomena under 
research, for example the degree of politicization or socialization, are hard to quantify. Moreover, 
the number of decision-making processes that would have to be covered for thirteen hypotheses 
to be tested with reasonable certainty would be too large for this project. 
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6. Case selection: Why China and the 
Public Procurement Market Matter 
 
Reciprocity applies to all of Europe’s trading partners and to a multitude of markets, public and 
private. So why are China and the public procurement market singled out? This chapter functions 
as a backgrounder to EU-China trade relations, looking at the public procurement market in 
particular, and as a justification for selecting the public procurement instrument in relation to 
China as a test case. 
6.1. The Chinese market 
In the Global Europe policy paper on China the Commission outlined a set of core trade related 
issues which it would like to see resolved, of which access to China’s public procurement 
markets is one of them. It also explicitly mentioned the need for reciprocity in the trade 
relationship between the EU and China.
63
 The reason China deserved a separate strategy paper is 
not hard to guess; China is Europe’s second largest trade partner, thus making it one of Europe’s 
four strategic economic partners.
64
 So trade with China matters, and so do any barriers which 
might obstruct this trade. 
But the relationship is a troubled one. From a European viewpoint China has 
insufficiently liberalized its markets. More precisely, China has not sufficiently opened its public 
procurement programs to foreign firms; it denies foreign companies access to whole economic 
sectors;
65
 it insufficiently enforces intellectual property rights (IPRs); demands the transfer of 
technologies, or demands partnerships with a Chinese majority shareholdership; lacks transparent 
rules and regulations; has discriminatory R&D subsidies and export subsidies in place that 
undermine the creation of a level playing field; and has various other restrictions in place that 
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obstruct essential supply chains.
66
 China on the other hand is frustrated that Europe refuses to 
grant the country Market Economy Status (MES), has unpredictable anti-dumping regulations, 
and continues to uphold an arms-embargo in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.
67
 
 
To understand the economically viable but troubled trade relationship between the EU and China, 
it pays to look at the markedly different economic and political models of the EU and China. The 
EU’s official slogan is “united in diversity”.68 Although the EU has a supranational governmental 
structure, the Europeans seldom speak with one voice and EU member states continue to enjoy a 
significant degree of self-determination. Today, the EU still largely remains a project of 
economic integration.69 Characteristic of the European project is the drive to eliminate 
obstructions of the movement of goods, services, and people across member states. Economic 
integration soon required integration of other areas. The European single market, the Schengen 
agreement, and the Euro are its embodiments. These projects required the harmonization and 
equalization of laws and regulations. The pursuit of common policies has been called “positive” 
or “deep integration”.70  The promotion of European norms, regulations, and values is supposed 
to foster economic prosperity and political stability. 
Arguably, deep integration has turned Europe into a powerful economic block that is able 
to sway its bilateral partners and policy-making at international forums to a greater extent than 
any individual member state could unilaterally achieve. This asymmetrical economic power vis-
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à-vis other states was thought to work as a bargaining chip that could not only pry open foreign 
markets but could also be used to change non-trade policies in partner countries.71 Because of the 
sheer economic weight of the EU, non-EU members might be incentivized to adopt European 
common values such as the universality of inviolable and inalienable human rights, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law, and open markets. Studying the promotion of common 
European norms, Manners wondered whether Europe was becoming a normative power.72 But 
China on the other hand might be less receptive to this message. 
European countries still have their national champions, and the post world-war two scheme 
of embedded liberalism provided for a balance between market capitalism and state control. But 
the liberalization wave on which Great Britain embarked during the Thatcher era, and which 
many continental European countries followed, and the catch-up of the old Warsaw Pact states, 
has transformed Europe into a more market centric and less state centric continent (the current 
crisis is reversing this trend). Although European SOEs have not vanished, and by selecting 
certain indicators one could argue that the state capitalism is even more predominant in Europe 
than it is in China,73 EU members typically house fairer, more open, less intrusive governments, 
more transparent, and more level economic playing fields than China. For the EU at large, well 
regulated but nevertheless free and open markets are considered an intrinsic good. 
 
Relative to the EU, China is a monolith, a single-party state seeking to control the social, 
political, and economic fabric and direction of the country. That local state bodies are not to 
diverge too much from the party line dictated by Beijing was recently demonstrated by the Bo 
Xilai’s fall from grace as party secretary of Chongqing province. Kissinger argues that Chinese 
leadership judges the appropriateness of economic policy (such as market liberalization) in terms 
of whether it serves political stability.
74
 In China’s view, western norms, regulations, and values 
do not necessarily guarantee this stability, nor do western notions of democracy, human rights 
                                                          
71
 S. Meunier and K. Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 13, no. 6 (2006): 906–925. 
72
 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 
(2002): 235–258; I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 182–199. 
73
 Niall Ferguson, “We’re All State Capitalists Now,” Foreign Policy, February 9, 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/09/we_re_all_state_capitalists_now?print=yes&hidecomments=y
es&page=full. 
74
 H. Kissinger, “The New Millennium,” in On China, 1st ed. (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 494. 
33 
 
and the environment necessarily reflect Chinese values.
75
 This is also reflected in the words 
chosen by Dai Bingguo (China’s State Councilor) who emphasizes China’s path of “peaceful 
development” based on “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.76 
 
For several decades, Chinese leadership has been pursuing an economic doctrine typified as 
“Corporatism” or a variant of the “East Asian Model”,77 “Politicized Capitalism”,78 “State 
Capitalism”,79 or “Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics”.80 Albeit minor differences in 
characterizing this doctrine, the central tenets the same. In the Chinese model, there is a strong 
triangular relationship between the party, the bureaucracy, and the corporations. Together these 
three actors determine the shape of the market such as the degree of market liberalization and 
market access to foreign investors. It is not always clear which of the three is in the lead. 
Economic sectors which the government regard to be of utmost strategic importance because they 
serve the national interest, such as telecommunications, automotives, banking, defense, (green) 
energy, chemical industry, rare earth metals, agriculture and food, textile, are dominated by state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) under the supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council.
81
 One could speak of a tiered economic system, 
where government control and market competition vary depending on the strategic significance 
of the economic sector for the Chinese government.
82
 
SOEs in these sectors receive preferential treatment by the Chinese government, to the 
detriment of foreign and domestic private competitors.
83
 National and international private 
corporations are crowded out of markets by SOEs as the latter have access to cheap capital and 
                                                          
75
 Joschka Fischer, “Chinese Values?,” Project Syndicate, April 23, 2012, http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/chinese-values-. 
76
 Dai Bingguo, “Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development,” China Daily, December 13, 2010, sec. Op-Ed, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-12/13/content_11690133.htm. 
77
 Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model,” The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, no. 33 (1995): 29–53. 
78
 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, “China’s Politicized Capitalism” (Worldbank, 2006), 
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHIINDGLOECO/Resources/Keefer%28032906%291.pdf. 
79
 Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of  Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (2009): 40–55; Su Changhe, 
“Understanding Chinese Diplomatic Transformation: A Multi-Actors’ Perspective,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 
no. 5 (2010): 313–329. 
80
 Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
81
 BusinessEurope, Rising to the China Challenge (Brussels: BusinessEurope, October 2011), 64. 
82
 M.M. Pearson, “The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory 
State,” World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 296–322. 
83
 The Economist, The Visible Hand, Special Report: State Capitalism, January 21, 2012, 6. 
34 
 
political patronage. The implication is unequal market access for (inter)national competitors.
84
 
Many foreign firms that do succeed in entering the market are allowed so under the condition that 
they share technology
85
 or provide majoritarian shareholdership for the Chinese counterpart.
86
 
And although the decline of SOEs in China in absolute numbers suggests SOE’s are receding, the 
SOEs still “maintain an unshakable position in China’s current national economy. In overseas 
purchases, SOEs are usually the major players.”87 The SOEs that remain “are becoming wealthier 
and more powerful even as the overall state sector shrinks, and governments are tightening their 
grip on the commanding heights of the economy even as the private sector grows.”88 All in all 
China’s State Capitalism remains fundamentally engrained in the political-economic model of the 
country. 
With China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 it was hoped China would further reform its 
domestic markets so to become more alike western liberal market economies. Although progress 
within the WTO competencies has been promising, plenty of non-trade barriers and government 
interference have remained. Even though foreign companies remain attracted to the profitable 
Chinese market, the domestic business-climate has worsened in recent years according to the 
World Bank and the American Chamber of Commerce.
89
 The European Chamber in China 
(EUCham) maintains that some progress has been made in 2011 but that numerous market entry 
and participatory problems persist. Moreover, EUCham found that compared to a 2010 survey an 
increasing number of its members (43%) “felt that over the past two years government policies 
have become more discriminatory and 46% feel that this trend will continue over the next two 
years.”90 Trade Commissioner De Gucht has also noted the adverse business climate.91 Scholars 
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have even labeled Chinese reforms as mere window dressing.
92
 As Fox and Godement of the 
ECFR argue; “China seems to have seen [WTO] membership as the conclusion of its reform 
process rather than the beginning”.93 
The current economic crisis has increasingly delegitimized the western model of free, and 
open markets, further crediting Russian, Brazilian, and Chinese models of managed capitalism.
94
 
And while the G20 renewed its pledge against protectionism in 2011,
95
 there is a noticeable up-
spike in protectionist measures in China and, also to the frustration of the EU,
96
 in South 
America.
97
 Whether the hype of China’s rise is justified when it is clear the country also faces 
daunting internal challenges
98
 is of course another question. 
The Chinese have stepped up their presence in Europe. In the midst of the global economic 
crisis China has sought to buy numerous European brands and companies such as MG, Volvo and 
Draka.
99
 China has also bought up undisclosed quantities of debt paper of several Southern 
European states and Germany. The Chinese sovereign debt market on the other hand is not 
accessible to foreign investors. The irony is that China reaps the benefits of the open European 
single market, while keeping shut many domestic markets to foreign companies. 
6.2 The Relevance of the Public Procurement Market 
There are many methods by which positive and reciprocal trade relations  (the mutual opening of 
markets) can be attained. So why the focus on the public procurement instrument and how does 
China relate to this particular market? The reason so much attention is paid to this particular 
instrument probably has to do with the fact that alternative routes to induce reciprocal behavior 
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(in the public procurement market) have not been that effective. In 2006 the EU already 
acknowledged that the WTO framework, although essential, was not sufficient in removing non-
tariff barriers.
100
 
Reciprocity in trade has been pursued by the European Union (Europe or EU) via 
numerous routes. Multilaterally via WTO trade negotiations, the Doha Development Round being 
the latest and, in case of conflict, via the WTO dispute settlement body. Bilaterally the EU does 
so via the accession of new EU member states (which is limited to “European” countries), or via 
the negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCA). A fifth option is the use of trade instruments by the EU, which are thought to coerce 
trading partners into adhering to a reciprocal trade relation. But towards China these methods 
have, leave the fifth (whose effectiveness has yet to be proven), reaped less substantial results for 
Europe than initially hoped for. 
Regarding the WTO, the Doha round stalled in 2008, leaving little prospects for a new 
round of global trade liberalization any time soon. Second, the WTO’s GPA, whose members 
(including the EU) agree to open their public procurement markets to one another, has yet to 
welcome China (as well as India and the majority of WTO countries) as members. Although 
China eventually submitted its application to become a GPA member in December 2007 it has 
until this date made two market liberalization offers, the 2008 offer was received by GPA 
members as “very limited” and “deeply disappointing,101 the December 2011 offer was received 
with more enthusiasm although some members, especially the US, remained lukewarm to the 
Chinese proposal.
102
 Still, even if China joins, a recent study finds that preferential procurement 
agreements have no effect on governments’ purchasing behavior: signatories are no more 
inclined than non-signatories to spend public funds on imports.
103
 The GPA framework may thus 
not be that effective in opening up public procurement markets to foreign companies. 
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On bilateral agreements, it should be noted that in 2007 the EU and China launched 
negotiations on a PCA. These negotiations are still ongoing. But although laudable for its 
ambitious agenda, as it attempts to cover the full spectrum of EU-China relations (democracy, 
human rights, the arms embargo, intellectual property rights, market economy status, market 
access, good governance, environmental concerns, etc.), this is also its weakness. Many of these 
issues are highly sensitive to both sides; by logrolling all these issues (both trade and non-trade 
related) one can be sure these negotiations will drag on. Because the EU discusses these issues in 
tandem, concrete trade issues are unnecessarily complicated. Hence progress is expected to be 
slow on both political and economic tracks.
104
 
Much the same can be said about the likelihood of an EU-China FTA. While an 
advantage over a PCA is that it contains “trade only” issues, the EU and China have not even 
embarked on any preliminary FTA negotiation. Moreover, it still includes many sensitive issues 
which both parties are unlikely to compromise on. As Sally explains; 
 
“China is unlikely to get what it wants from the EU through an FTA: recognition of market-
economy status; stronger disciplines on EU anti-dumping and safeguard measures; removal 
of peak tariffs on garments, leather goods and other manufactured exports; reduction of EU 
agricultural subsidies and tariffs to open markets for its expanding agricultural exports; and 
less trade-restrictive EU SPS and TBT measures. All these measures restrict China’s labour 
intensive goods exports. FTA negotiations would put extra pressure on the EU to reduce or 
remove many of these barriers, which would expose inefficient EU producers to even greater 
Chinese competition. That is why the EU does not want an FTA with China.”
105
 
 
So with a PCA and FTA seeming rather unlikely, the reciprocal opening of markets has to be 
supported by some form of incentive (a carrot or a stick) for the third country. Unless of course 
this country adheres to the free market ideology, which China clearly does not. Being a relatively 
accessible and open market as it is (which is of course also disputable statement), the EU has not 
presented China with many additional incentives to open up its own markets. There have been 
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numerous suggestions on how the EU could incentivize China to reciprocate; put China’s market 
economy status back on the negotiation table, make the lifting of the weapons-embargo 
negotiable again, assign the EU co-ownership over the European IPR (patents and key 
technologies) so to guard over technology-transfers and IPR protection, close the European 
procurement market to countries which subsidize their firms in procurement bids and refuse to 
open their own procurement market to European firms.
106
 
But many of these options are not feasible. One DG Trade official commented that if one 
would take the proverbial fine comb and go through all the possible instruments which the EU 
has at its disposal to open markets in China (not just the public procurement market) one realizes 
that hardly any of them are usable or desirable. Tariffs are bound by WTO regulation; the 
services sector in the EU is de facto open and party bound by WTO regulation; and the GPA only 
binds 16 WTO members. Lastly, even if the EU establishes a single market for IPR, it remains 
unsure whether this can really be used as a form of leverage towards China; demanding 
technology transfers from China or establishing restrictions on how Chinese companies may use 
R&D funds is unwanted and not even and option today.
A6
 
While certainly no silver bullet, the public procurement instrument is meant to contribute 
to the opening of markets.
107
 Naturally, the reciprocity principle and the public procurement 
instrument would apply to all trading partners of Europe. While the European Union will not 
publically acknowledge that the public procurement instrument was specifically designed with 
China in mind, the Chinese are worried enough to send representatives to Brussels to gauge the 
implications of the proposed instrument.
108
 
In recent years Chinese companies have also become more active in the European public 
procurement market directly or through local companies, making numerous bids on various 
projects (highways, bridges, water purification plants) across Eastern Europe, the ultimately 
unsuccessful highway bid in Poland catching most of the attention.
109
 Regarding the Chinese 
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public procurement market “only a fraction of the (…) market is open to foreign business.”110 
The United States Government estimates the Chinese public procurement market to be worth 
$500 billion in 2010,
111
 whereas the Chinese government puts the figure at $100 billion for 
2010.
112
 Although the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle this market could even come 
close to rivaling the European public procurement market in size (€420 billion of which €352 
billion is accessible to companies from WTO member countries). In 2007 it was estimated that 
the Chinese accession to the WTO GPA could open up $35 billion of the Chinese public 
procurement market.
113
 The large Chinese stimulus packages rolled out in 2009 in response to the 
global economic crisis means that these figures should be (temporarily) scaled upward. Today the 
EU puts the figure at €83 billion.114 
When one leaves aside the talk of China’s rise, one may wonder whether the United 
States and Japan are not equally important in this context, being the first and third economy 
(second and fourth if one counts the EU single market). If we compare the 2010 figures – the 
United States (€178 billion accessible to foreign bidders out of €556,3 billion total) and Japan 
(€27 billion out of €96,4 billion)115 – we see that the Japanese market is a dwarf. Also, bear in 
mind that the United States is a member of the GPA which makes its negotiations and obligations 
in the field of public procurement more institutionalized. 
In the case China does open up European countries would of course have to contend with 
other foreign rivals. The EU estimates that if its twelve largest trading partners would open up 
those public procurement markets for which they show interest in Europe it would lead to a 
potential increase in exports worth €4 billion leading to 60.000 additional jobs.116 China would 
account for a sizeable portion of this figure. But when one spreads out the positive impact across 
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the EU and when one compares the €4 billion to the €136,2 billion which the EU exported to 
China in 2011,
117
 then the liberalization of the public procurement market may seem 
insignificant. But one must place these figures in a larger picture. The economic crisis has made 
new sources of growth increasingly sought after. And China is certainly one of them. As a 
representative of INTA noted while paraphrasing George Soros’s claim that the best way to 
tackle the crisis, is to overgrow it, is that “the cheapest way to do so is to access new markets.”A5 
 
Now that I have provided the reader with a bit of context and demonstrated the relevance of 
China and the public procurement market it is time to look at the results of this case study. 
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7. Results: From Talking the Talk to 
Walking the Walk 
 
What follows is a chronological narrative about the development of, support for, and decision-
making on the reciprocity principle and the public procurement instrument from 2006-2012. 
Based on this overview I then provide a more focused review of the implications for the 
hypotheses towards the end of this chapter. Some hypotheses warrant a more detailed discussion 
than others as the findings sometimes naturally flow from the story. Some preliminary 
notifications. 
One crucial line of thought that ran through nearly all the interviews was that 2006 and 
2010-2012 are two worlds apart. The most important factors mentioned were the continued 
discrepancy between the open European single market and the trade barriers in the Chinese 
market, the (perceived) rise of China, and the economic crisis. These developments added fuel to 
the protectionist mindset in Europe. Besides issues with China, adverse market access conditions 
in the America’s and Japan were also mentioned. Although the instrument would target all 
countries not engaging in bilateral of multilateral market liberalization, a sizeable group of 
respondents did argue that the public procurement proposal was strongly inspired by 
developments in China. 
Additionally one specific case seemed to sensitize the Commission, Council, and EP to 
the discrepancy between the EU and Chinese market, sparking a demand for greater regulation in 
the public procurement market. This was the infamous Chinese bid to build a stretch of Polish 
highway. Many acknowledged that the response was disproportionally large to the actual influx 
of Chinese activity on the European public procurement market. Hence the highway deal should 
be treated more for its symbolic value by showing the discrepancy between the open EU market 
and the closed Chinese market. 
While a sizeable group of respondents did not outright acknowledge that the decision-
making process took exceptionally long, the majority of respondents observed that the public 
procurement instrument has been or is likely to remain a drawn out process. Moreover, nearly all 
interviews provided information from which it was possible to discern where the greatest 
bottlenecks lie in the development of the proposal. 
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7.1. A Changing Tone and A New Instrument 
The European Commission’s 2006 “Global Europe” policy papers118 marked the beginning of 
EU’s tougher stance on trade relations, and trade with China in particular. According to Evenett 
from the Bruegel think tank, the conception that the promotion of European norms and rules is 
intrinsically good became less salient.
119
 Others have labeled this arcane approach as one of 
“unconditional engagement” towards China; that regardless of what progression the country 
makes in “Europeanizing” its economic and political system, the EU will remain positively 
engaged without demanding too much in return, so that over time the country would naturally 
mirror itself to the European system.
120
 It does not digress much from a free trader’s view; that 
markets should be kept open to foreign companies, regardless of what protectionist measures 
might be taken abroad. According to Evenett, this approach was now “couched” in the 
propagation of European commercial and economic interests.
121
 The Commission outlined a core 
set of trade issues which it would like to see resolved with China. Among them was the issue of 
access to the Chinese public procurement market. 
The second change noted was that the policy papers contained a tougher narrative. Out of 
dissatisfaction with the progress China was making in opening its domestic markets to foreign 
competitors, the fear was expressed that if China failed to open up further “the EU-China 
relationship will not be seen as genuinely reciprocal.”122 Moreover, the EU seems to feel that 
large and fast growing developing countries such as China should no longer expect an 
“undemanding non-reciprocal package of access to the EU market” on the basis of their 
developing country status. In the future the EU will treat them in a similar way to industrialized 
trading partners.
123
 The Financial Times, commenting on the papers, observed that the EU 
“adopts a tough stance towards Beijing on a range of issues, especially government procurement, 
intellectual property, subsidies and the country’s lax environmental and social standards. It makes 
clear that China must be more open to European companies if relations are to be “politically and 
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economically sustainable.”124 As I will demonstrate this narrative is traceable from 2006-2012 in 
publications and public statements of the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament, 
albeit in varying degrees. 
The “hard-nosed” approach towards China was also picked up by Parello-Plesner of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) who argued that it remained to be seen whether what had 
been declared on paper would also lead to the development of concrete policies.
125
 Was it just 
talk or could the EU also walk the reciprocity walk? In other words, would the EU be able to 
develop instruments that will encourage reciprocal opening?
126
 Analysts of ECFR mentioned one 
instrument in particular, the public procurement instrument, to be the litmus test for this tougher 
stance on EU-China trade relations.
127
 And this instrument was eventually drafted in 2012. The 
EU’s main argument for proposing this instrument: 
 
“The EU’s principal problem is a lack of leverage in its international negotiations with 
trading partners to redress the imbalance and to gain substantial market access 
commitments for the benefit of EU business. [...] This initiative aims at solving these 
problems by firstly strengthening the position of the European Union when negotiating 
access for EU companies to the public procurement markets of third countries.”
128
 
 
So what are the core components of the current proposal? It is built on a dual mechanism. The 
first component would allow member states, with the Commission’s approval, to block tenders 
above €5 million, where the value of non-covered goods and services exceeds 50% of the total 
value of goods included in the tender.
129
 Non-covered goods and services are defined as goods 
and services originating in third countries which have not sufficiently opened their markets,
130
 or 
in the words of the Commission; where “there is a lack of substantial reciprocity in market 
opening between the EU and the country from which the goods and/or services originate.”131 
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Should a member state choose to accept sub-market price tenders that match the aforementioned 
criteria, then it must notify all the other bidders.
132
 
 The second component is a safeguard against the automatic closure of the EU public 
procurement market to third countries, although the Commission may ultimately decide to do so. 
It will enable the Commission to initiate on its own initiative, or by request of a member state, an 
investigation into restrictive public procurement practices of a third country. Should market 
access be found wanting, the Commission can then ask that country to enter into consultation 
with the EU in order to remove these restrictions. Should the country be “unwilling to engage 
into consultations or [unwilling to] provide satisfactory solutions to the restrictive procurement 
measures, the European Union could take a decision to temporarily restrict the access of goods 
and/or services from that country to the EU public procurement market.”133 
Should the consultation be promising, should the country demonstrate satisfactory 
progress in opening its market via detailed provisions on the phasing-out of market barriers, or 
given that the country enters into an FTA or the GPA, (the threat of) market closure may be 
suspended.
134
 
 
What is interesting to note was that the public consultation on the proposal demonstrated that this 
dual mechanism was in fact the least preferred option among respondents. A DG Trade official 
however argued that the public consultation feedback is “not a sondage” but rather a guiding 
tool.
A9
 Still a sizeable minority of 35% even preferred no new regulation at all. This figure was 
even 75% among contracting parties (governments and contractors). Some feared that the 
proposal would lead to retaliatory and protectionist measures in third countries.
135
 Moreover, the 
impact assessment board was unable to give a positive opinion on the current proposal citing 
among other things issues with the models used to calculate the impact as well as the insufficient 
justification of the proportionality of the preferred option.
136
 Will the instrument do Europe more 
good than harm? Will it lead to a more open public procurement sector? 
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One could indeed argue that any instruments aimed at enhancing the EU’s leverage in 
creating greater market access can be associated with or quickly devolve into protectionism.
137
 
The reciprocity principle does not belong in the toolbox of a free trader, especially so because 
trade instruments are per definition tools to steer trade flows. True free traders would argue 
against any form of trade obstruction. From a moral point of view Cobden argued that 
government should not have the power to impose limits on the consumption of imported goods 
by its citizens as it would infringe on the “inalienable right of every man freely to exchange the 
result of his labour for the productions of other people”.138 From an economic viewpoint it has 
been argued
139
 and demonstrated
140
  that protectionism diverts capital and labor to less efficient 
industries, leading to higher costs per produced unit than if that product would have been bought 
from that country holding the comparative advantage of the production of that good. 
The Commission, aware of this conundrum, stresses that the instrument aims to promote 
positive reciprocity; to open markets, not to close them.
141
 While the debate on trade ideology is a 
very interesting one, and I generally consider myself part of the free trade camp, I do not delve 
further into the rights and wrongs of trade ideology. The political decision has been made to find 
new ways to leverage reciprocity and ECFR policy analysts have endorsed this move but are 
disappointed with the results thus far. Undoubtedly the belief that the EU needs to toughen up 
and this disappointment are informed by a reasonable degree of subjectivity. 
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7.2. The Commission 
The public procurement instrument made its first appearance in a Commission staff working 
document in October 2006. It was presented as a way to get Europe’s trade partners to commit to 
reciprocal opening of public procurement markets “without closing our own.” The instrument 
was seen as a supplementary tool to the GPA and FTAs. Noting that “the broad openness of the 
EU public procurement market does not encourage partners to negotiate reciprocal market 
access” it was argued that “In certain limited cases, it may be that greater openness in the 
procurement markets of major trading partners can only be achieved through the possibility of 
carefully targeted restrictions on access to the EU (procurement) market.”142 
Mandelson’s DG Trade cabinet (2004-2008) proposed the instrument because it was 
becoming more concerned that continuing market liberalization was losing support among 
member states, the Southern member states in particular. The myriad of trade issues between 
China and the EU, the ultimate abolishment of European import restrictions on footwear and 
textiles from China in 2004-2005 and the continued trade barriers in China despite WTO 
accession were making it hard for the Commission to sell the free trade narrative to all EU 
members.
A10
 In addition, closed public procurement markets in Canada, the US, and Japan were a 
nuisance to the EU.
A9
 While not a principled supporter of the reciprocity principle, nor of the 
public procurement instrument, Mandelson hoped that a harder line on trade with China and 
increased safeguards in the form of the instrument could push China and other countries in the 
right direction and sustain support amongst Southern and Eastern EU member states for 
continued trade liberalization.
A10
 The Commission sensed it was time to signal trade 
liberalization was not a one way street.
A4 
Mandelson told Chinese representatives to improve 
market access or face a protectionist backlash in Europe.
143
 In a later speech he said reciprocity 
should lead to greater openness in both countries, not reciprocal barriers, but he also stated that 
“Openness can only function on the basis of a fair level of reciprocity from our major trading 
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partners in the developed and emerging economies. Otherwise I cannot sustain the case for 
openness in Europe [emphasis added by author].”144 
The public procurement instrument was discussed in the TPC on multiple occasions 
between 2006 and 2008 where it faced an outright hostile response from the like minded 
countries of the North.
A8, A10
 Even though no formal proposal by the Commission was made until 
March 2012, the (at times informal) discussions in the Council’s TPC and between the Council 
and Commission between 2006 and 2008 revealed to the Commission that the proposal was 
unlikely to pass.
A7, A9
 Under the Ashton Cabinet (2008-2009), there seemed to be a deliberate 
radio silence on the public procurement instrument. It was not a priority for this cabinet and the 
time did not seem right yet to propose it once more.
A10 
 
It took until October 2010 for the instrument to reappear on the Commission’s agenda. Then the 
Commission formally announced that it would propose an overhaul of public procurement rules. 
The aim of the instrument according to the Commissions Work Programme for 2011 was to 
increase EU leverage in order to improve access to public procurement markets in “developed 
and large emerging economies”, mentioning China explicitly.145 As part of Europe’s 
comprehensive trade strategy under the title “Europe in the World: pulling our weight on the 
global stage” the initiative was supposed to have its first proposal by the 3rd quarter of 2011.146 
The Commission overshot its target by six months, culminating in a proposal for a regulation on 
“on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public 
procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to 
the public procurement markets of third countries” in March 2012.147 
This second time around the procurement instrument was led by DG MARKT and then 
turned into a shared initiative with DG Trade. There were significant differences in opinion 
between DG Trade and DG MARKT. Several respondents argued that although DG Trade was 
generally opposed to the instrument, it decided to join DG MARKT in the hope to bring the 
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proposal more in line with its views on trade policy.
A7, A11
 DG MARKT was originally hoping for 
a more ambitious proposal where the EU public procurement market might be closed 
automatically under certain conditions. DG Trade was strongly opposed to this as it would send 
off the wrong signal to Europe’s trade partners.A3, A6 
DG Trade officials from both Mandelson’s cabinet and De Gucht’s cabinet argued that 
their DG saw the reciprocity and public procurement instrument as a necessary evil to secure 
more open markets in the long run.
A6, A10
 Overall, DG Trade under De Gucht (2010-) has been 
very cautious in presenting reciprocity as positive reciprocity. The bottom line was that this 
instrument would lead to more market access.
148
 Inside DG MARKT under McCreevy (2004-
2010), there was no discernible talk about the principle. But DG MARKT Commissioner Barnier 
(2010-) has been quite vocal on the subject.
149
 To paraphrase Barnier, commenting on the drafted 
instrument on EuroparlTV; if China heavily subsidizes a company in a bid for a European tender 
but refuses to open its domestic public procurement market, Europe should be able to block bids 
from China in its public procurement market.
150
 This also means that if China demonstrates 
greater openness, Europe will respond positively in return. In the words of the current 
Commission: “The EU will remain an open economy but will not be naïve.”151 
While three interviewees acknowledged these differences were there but that they had less 
of an impact on the decision-making pace,
A3, A4
 other Commission officials argued that a 
difference in competence (one focusing on external trade, the other managing the single market) 
and a difference in prevailing ideology between the two DGs did lead to intense discussion in the 
run up to the 2012 public procurement proposal.
A6, A7
 Besides personal differences between De 
Gucht (a liberal and free trade proponent) and Barnier (a right winger with social aspects),
A3, A6
 
their DGs were also naturally inclined to favor certain policies over others due to their 
competencies. DG MARKT, in charge of the EU single market, was defined as more inward 
looking and hence more willing to propose what some might consider protectionist measures to 
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the benefit of European enterprise. DG Trade deals with Europe’s external dimension of trade 
and is hence more readily concerned with how European regulation might affect trade flows 
between the EU and third party countries.
A7, A9 
So did interest heterogeneity matter? Several Commission officials and TPC country 
representatives linked this disagreement to a drawn out decision-making process in the 
Commission.
A9, A10
 Two TPC members claimed this disagreement was caused the Commission to 
overshoot its own deadline by six months.
A9
 It took more time to reconcile the differences within 
the Commission. As one Commission official put it “socialization is the nature of the beast”;A7 in 
the end compromise between DGs Trade and MARKT led to a proposal both were satisfied 
with.
A3, A6 
Many noted that even though DG Trade and DG MARKT are in the lead on this proposal, 
the proposal was ultimately the result of bargaining between the DGs, their units, and the final 
vote in the College meeting of the Commission.
A6
 The Legal Service and the Impact Assessment 
Board also had to scrutinize the proposal.
A4, A6
 Even the External Action Service voiced its 
concern about the instrument.
A9
 One respondent hinted that the negative opinion of the IAB 
might have delayed the proposal.
A4
 But in the end the Commission did present a proposal even 
though the IAB did not provide a positive opinion in this proposal either. Two respondents 
claimed that the high number of decision-makers in the Commission did indeed slow down the 
development of the proposal.
A9, A10
 Yet several other Commission officials said this factor played 
no discernible role.
A6, A7
 One respondents said that once the proposal was discussed and voted on 
at College level there was no protracted attempt by the other cabinets to block it.
A6 
7.3. Countries 
The divide between Northern Europe and Southern Europe plays a crucial role in the decision-
making process. Eastern European member states are however a less cohesive group. Even 
though this geographical distinction is of limited value because geographical position does not 
always reflect the common position on trade matters in their geographical neighborhood, I 
nevertheless resort to these labels for lack of better names. 
 
The Northern European member states were and remain strongly opposed to the principle of 
reciprocity and the public procurement instrument. Countries that are considered part of this 
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group are; The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta. Germany is widely associated with this 
group of “like-minded” countries but has also been called the middle man (positioning itself 
between the Northern liberals and the Southern mercantilists).
A9
 Several respondents indicated 
that over time Germany has grown slightly more receptive to the reciprocity and trade-restriction 
narrative but nevertheless remains more of a free-trader.
A6, A11, A12
 On sector specific interests (car 
industry, construction) Germany might sometimes take on a more protectionist stance than it 
would usually do.
A6, A7, A9, A12 
The main arguments brought up for opposing the principle and the accompanied 
instrument were the following. First, there is the free-trader principle that European markets 
should remain open regardless of the market restrictions in third countries.
A8
 The instrument 
would send the wrong signal to Europe’s trade partners, risking a protectionist backlash rather 
than market opening.
A12
 Northern states have called it disguised protectionism.
A1, A10
 I was noted 
that China is particularly well known to retaliate with measures negatively impacting European 
companies when it is unhappy with European policy.
A1
 Second, there is the argument that the 
proposal gives individual member states too much freedom on trade policy.
A12, 152 
Third, there 
was the argument that trade restrictions imposed by the EU would lead to rising costs because 
cheaper (more competitive) foreign bidders could be blocked; this negatively impacts the 
economic prosperity of Europe.
A1
 The proposal is also problematic for this group of countries 
because many of their companies have outsourced part of their production activities to China; 
they fear the instrument (especially condition on “non-covered goods”) might negatively affect 
these companies because it will be hard to identify whether goods are more European than they 
are Chinese.
A1, A7, A10
 Running through all these arguments is a value for money consideration; 
the Northerners want the best product for the lowest price. 
 
The countries which are strongly in favor of the Commission’s proposal are the Club Med 
countries; France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece. Across the board France was considered the 
vanguard of the reciprocity principle and the public procurement instrument. Several respondents 
have indicated that Spain and Italy have over time become more aware that economic growth in 
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Europe is much dependent on Chinese economic growth and that the threat of trade restrictions 
might work adversely in bringing about more viable trade relations.
A1, A12
 An example was the 
realization by the Italians that their luxury brand industry increasingly relied on the expanding 
middle and upper class in China.
A10
 But overall, these Southern European member states have 
been and remain supportive of the Commission’s proposal. 
Main arguments for supporting the proposal are the following. First, the argument that 
many European companies cannot compete with Chinese competitors.
A9
 Contingent to this 
argument is that Europe should be more restrictive in providing market access to foreign 
competitors, who enter the EU market on unfair terms (subsidies), so to protect companies and 
jobs inside the EU.
A7, A11
 Second, this country grouping is especially frustrated by the continued 
discrepancy between the relatively open European single market, and the continued trade barriers 
in countries such as China.
A7, A10
 The sentiment is that Europe has been too naïve vis-à-vis China 
and has been taken for a ride by the Chinese.
A10
 Because Europe’s trade partners were not 
opening up their markets in return, the group has grown more and more opposed to Europe’s free 
trade agenda.
A3, A4, A8 
 
The viewpoints of Eastern European member states is much more tentative. In principle they 
strongly support the need for a more reciprocal and balanced trade relationship with China. 
Countries that were typically associated with this group are Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovakia. From the interviews it remained unclear where Bulgaria and Romania stand on the 
matter, but the ECFR reports put them in the protectionist camp.
153
 They seemed more worried 
than the Southern European group about the trade imbalances between their countries and China. 
They are less concerned about how Chinese trade barriers might obstruct bidding by domestic 
companies in China as there is a feeling that their companies would not be able to compete in the 
Chinese market anyway.
A9
 Their support for the public procurement instrument is more 
contingent on the position of the Northern or Southern European country with whom they have 
the most important economic relation. In the case of one Eastern European country, this would 
mean finding a balance between the German and Italian viewpoint.
A8
 They will generally not take 
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the lead on the procurement instrument but follow the line of the Commission and their more 
vocal European trade partners.
A8 
 
All three camps agree that the crisis has made the search for new growth markets essential for 
spurring economic growth inside Europe. They only fundamentally differ on how this should be 
achieved. The Southern European member states argue that economic sustainability can either be 
ensured by shielding European enterprise from unfair foreign competition,
A7, A9
 or that it must be 
found in growth markets such as China but that the procurement instrument is a necessary stick to 
gain access to them.
A5, A9
 The North argues that the unconditional opening of the EU public 
procurement market avoids protectionism abroad, which leads to lower costs for tax payers and 
consumers and is hence the cheapest way to weather the economic crisis.
A1, A12 
Respondents did 
not always agree on how much these cleavages have changed between 2006 and 2012. But 
despite observing minor shifts all generally agreed that there was a persistence over time of the 
divergence between the North and the South.
 
7.4. The Council 
Only by September 2010 did the r-word surface in a European Council meeting.
154
 Subsequently 
the President of the European Council van Rompuy announced that reciprocity was no longer a 
bad word.
155
 
 
“The European Council discussed how to give new momentum to the Union's external 
relations, taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty. It agreed 
on the need for Europe to promote its interests and values more assertively and in a spirit 
of reciprocity and mutual benefit.”
156
 
 
The European Council conclusions text further acknowledged the need for greater market access 
with major trade partners. In text the r-word is disguised in the argument that “partnerships are 
two-way streets based on mutual interests and benefits and on the recognition that all actors have 
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rights as well as duties.”157 During a European Council meeting over a year later, the principle 
and the need for mutual beneficial relations were again named. Besides the renewed focus on 
bilateral and regional agreements and economic relations with the European neighborhood the 
European Council conclusions called for a "new regulatory environment” but the public 
procurement instrument is missing from the examples given.
158
 Thus far the European Council 
has remained silent on the public procurement instrument. 
All TPC officials acknowledged that the aforementioned cleavages and arguments 
between EU member states (see countries section) did play out strongly in the discussions in the 
Council. Even though the Commission adopted the principle of reciprocity, along the North-
South divide there is disagreement on whether or not this should be the EU’s principle in trade. 
The like minded free traders were very much opposed to adopting the word in any Council 
decisions, while Southern and Eastern European member states did support the principle. 
Eventually the word was adopted by the Council, much to the surprise and under continued 
protest of the free traders.
A8, A9, A11
 The Northern response in the TPC to the Commission’s 
decision to develop the instrument was equally hostile.
A1, A8, A10, A11 
Many respondents argued that, judging from previous discussions on the public 
procurement instrument between 2006 and 2008 and the current positions of member states, the 
proposal is likely to face considerable opposition in the TPC. As it stand the proposal is unlikely 
to pass the TPC; the proposal will have to be amended significantly in order to gain support 
amongst the like minded Northerners.
A6, A7, A8, A11, A12 
Asking whether country representatives had over time grown more receptive towards each 
other’s viewpoints, most interviewees responded with skepticism. It was claimed that the 
cleavages persisted over time, meaning that just like the 2006-2008 period, the free traders have a 
large enough share of the vote to block the proposal.
A1, A8, A11, A12
 Voting will take place by QMV. 
Even if the proponents of the proposal (France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) would receive 
support from all countries that are not considered part of the Northern like minded group of free 
traders (Belgium, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg), they would still not surpass all the QMV threshold conditions. 
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Table 1. Majority threshold Council 
QMV requirements Council “Optimistic” scenario for proposal 
Majority of population (Commission proposal):   50% 51,9% 
Majority of voting weights:   74% 59,7% 
Majority of population:   62% 58,1% 
 
Sources: Treaty of Lisbon, Treaty of Nice, Eurostat (2011), Author’s calculations 
 
Was there no socialization at all between the TPC representatives? In fact there was plenty. 
While discussions on the reciprocity principle and the procurement instrument made country 
representatives more understanding of the differences among and motivations of one another, it 
did not lead to a change in viewpoints.
A8, A11, A12
 One TPC official also argued that the ability to 
have a fruitful discussion about the pro’s and con’s of the principle and the instrument depended 
much on the degree of leeway country representatives were given or willing to take and on the 
intellect of fellow TPC country representatives; some were in Brussels only to recite their 
capital’s position, and others were simply not capable of entertaining a discussion on an 
intellectual level sophisticated enough to reconcile differences.
A8
 Hence a continuation of the 
standoff between the pro reciprocity south (and east to a lesser degree) and the Northern free 
traders seems very likely. 
7.5. The European Parliament 
The findings for the European Parliament should be read with caution as the author was only able 
to speak to one representative of the INTA committee, despite several attempts to speak with 
MEPs. Although Council and Commission members did have their opinions regarding the EP, 
their claims should be read with caution as they are naturally less knowledgeable of the processes 
inside the EP. 
Scanning the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee (INTA) reports (five 
in total) on trade relations with or with relevance to China that were passed between 2005 and 
2012 also shows that there has been an increasing concern about the nature of this trade 
relationship. Until 2009 general market access concerns are voiced.
159
 But as of 2009 the 
message that the reciprocity principle should be one of the foundations of EU-China trade 
                                                          
159
 INTA, Prospects for EU-China Trade Relations (European Parliament, October 13, 2005), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2005-
0381+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
55 
 
relations featured in every report.
160
 Moreover, the EP has become increasingly assertive in its 
wording; the September 2011 report warns China that if it does not meet its WTO obligations, it 
risks European recourse to trade defense instruments, and it mentions the EU should pursue a 
reciprocal strategy towards China in trade and mentions public procurement as one of the focal 
points.
161
 The December 2011 report stressed reciprocity should be an integral part of EU trade 
strategy towards industrialized and emerging countries.
162
 Finally, the 2012 report explicitly 
asked the Commission to apply this principle to the EU common trade policy.
163
 
Thus far the European Parliament has played a less important role. The biggest hurdle is 
yet to come when the EP and Council get to amend the proposal; several respondents feared that 
the EP and the Council might not agree on the first reading of the proposal. Some argued the EP 
and especially the INTA harbor greater protectionist tendencies than the Council. The expectation 
is that the instrument will face intense discussion inside the Council and Parliament and between 
the two. Besides facing principled opposition to the instrument, respondents expect particularly 
intense discussion on the $5 million and 50% threshold.
A5, A7, A8 
One interviewee recognized that the European Parliament faces similar cleavages as the 
Council; although MEPs are organized by parties and political groups, when push comes to 
shove, they are often inclined to vote for what is in their country’s interest rather than in the 
common interest of the EU.
A7
 This may not be in line with the party, nor the political groups of 
the EP. Three outsiders however argued that overall, the EP and INTA are relatively more 
protectionist than the average view of the Council.
A9, A11
 If this is the case the joint deliberation 
on the public procurement instrument between EP and Council will be especially tough. The 
largest political group, the European People’s Party (271 MEPs) has been and remains a strong 
proponent of the reciprocity principle.
A5
 It could not be discerned how support amongst 
Europarliamentarians had changed over time and whether the interaction between MEPs or any 
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grooming by political groups has led or would lead over time to a softening of opinions between 
the proponents and opponents of the principle and instrument.  
It was denied that the 2011 INTA report, in which the EP asked the Commission to adopt 
the principle of reciprocity, took longer to draft than usual. The reviewed INTA reports, once in 
their final reading, were typically passed by ¾ voting in favor, thus easily surpassing the simply 
majority threshold. It was argued however that the texts underwent large changes from the 
moment they were drafted, to their final adoption, in order to garner enough support. It was added 
that this process naturally takes time. The EP denied that the high number of MEPs slowed down 
the process in any way. Ceteris paribus the high number of MEPs was typically not recognized as 
a hurdle in the decision-making process.
A5
 So even though the EP could have asked the 
Commission to firmly defend the reciprocity principle as of late 2009, neither the simple majority 
agreement threshold nor the number of MEPs involved negatively affected the speed of the 
decision-making.
A5 
7.6. Agreement Threshold (HI-HIII) 
While nobody outright rejected the claim that the high agreement threshold in the Commission 
affects the speed by which proposals can move forward,
A3, A4, A7
 few explicitly acknowledged that 
it did slow down the development of the proposal.
A9
 I conclude that there is only tentative 
support for HI. 
Among TPC country representatives there was widespread acknowledgement that the 
degree of support for the public procurement instrument was and remains insufficient to 
overcome QMV. The dominant view was that at least some of the free traders will have to relent 
their opposition if the proposal has any chance of passing.
A6, A7, A8, A9, A11, A12
 Enough support was 
found for HII. 
No evidence was found that the simple majority threshold of the EP slowed down the 
development of the INTA reports; in fact there was plenty of support judging that the reports 
greatly surpassed this threshold. It is too early to say how the threshold will impact the amending 
of the public procurement instrument. HIII will need further testing before any conclusions can be 
drawn. 
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7.7. Number of Veto Players (HIV-HVI) 
There was a mixed response among Commission officials. Two respondents denied the number 
of decision-makers had any impact on the speed of the decision-making process as the proposal is 
largely the joint-work of DG MARKT and DG Trade.
A6, A7
 Two other Commission officials 
however argued that high number of Commission bodies that sought to sway the instrument did 
slow down the decision-making process.
A9
 Overall support for HIV is tentative. 
How to get 27 countries in line is a recurring conundrum of the Council and the EU at 
large. While TPC country representatives could all distinguish between the three country 
groupings, it was acknowledged that even within these groups there were still a reasonable degree 
of disagreement on the public procurement instrument. The three groups are not tightly wound 
camps either. As demonstrated, Germany is one such example in the free trade group. Italy and 
Spain are examples in the Club Med group. It was generally acknowledged that the public 
procurement instrument had and would continue to face this conundrum making it harder to pass 
this proposal.
A7, A11, A12
 There was enough evidence to support HV. 
In garnering support for the reciprocity principle, the large number of MEPs seemed not 
to matter according to my EP source because. It is too early to know whether this factor will 
weigh in heavily in the discussion of the public procurement proposal.
A5 
7.8. Heterogeneity of Interests, Socialization Process (HVII-HIX) 
I find enough support for HVII and HVIII. The majority of Commission and TPC officials 
acknowledged that there was a lot of disagreement about the public procurement instrument 
inside both EU bodies. One Commission official claimed that sometimes their institution looked 
very much like the Council; with Commissioners being swayed by different country or 
ideologically induced interests.
A7
 As demonstrated, a lengthy bargaining process was needed 
between DG MARKT and DG Trade to reach a common proposal. We also saw that TPC 
representatives were very skeptical of the ability of the member states to reconcile their 
significant disagreements over the instrument. 
The INTA representative noted that it was still too early to discern how the preferences 
regarding the public procurement instrument are organized. He did however note that the INTA 
reports on reciprocity were the product of a lot of giving and taking amongst political groups 
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ultimately leading to a fairly high degree of agreement amongst MEPs on the final text. Despite 
significant differences, over time the EP managed to draft a report supported by a sizeable 
majority. He did not however feel that this took a particularly long time to achieve.
A5
 So there is 
tentative support for HIX in the case of the INTA reports on the reciprocity principle. 
7.9. Supranational Decision-making (HX) 
It was widely acknowledged that in the case of the public procurement instrument, the 
Commission played its model role as a supranational decision-maker; as an agenda setter with the 
common good of the EU at heart. As identified earlier the Commission recognized the instrument 
to be a necessary evil to 1) sustain support amongst Southern European member states for its 
trade liberalization agenda, and 2) hoped that in the long run the instrument could lead to positive 
reciprocity among Europe’s trade partners, leading to a greater openness of public procurement 
markets. The Commission representatives argued that the instrument was a reaction to a demand 
in Europe for greater safeguards but that it constructed the instrument in such a way so that it 
would be most acceptable to all stakeholders.
A3, A4, A6, A9, A10 
The pre-2010 Commission knew the proposal would face staunch opposition but 
nevertheless tried to place it on the agenda. The post-2010 Commission gave new impetus to the 
2006 proposal because it sensed that the economic and political climate had further shifted 
towards favoring this proposal. Before 2010 the Commission sensed there was only a tactical 
argument for supporting the instrument; as a way to increase the EU’s leverage.A7 But over time, 
with the worsening crisis and the increasing economic sway of China, it sensed that across 
Europe, a protectionist sentiment was also gaining ground.
A9
 While the Commission did not want 
to cater instruments to the protectionist agenda, it did sense that it could use this sentiment to 
garner support for an instrument that (paradoxically) would over time lead to less protectionism 
in the public procurement market.
A10 
Several respondents argued the Commission did try to create out an ambitious proposal 
for the benefit of the EU as a whole.
A3, A6
 And as time went by, more EU member states caught 
up with the Commission’s viewpoint.A10 But even though the Commission fulfilled this role, it 
seems unlikely that the current proposal will go down a smooth trajectory inside Council and EP. 
There is still much opposition to the instrument,
A1, A8, A11, A12
 despite the Commission’s effort to 
cater to the interests of all stakeholders. This is in line with HX. One factor that I did not account 
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for was the impact of Council presidencies. One TPC country representative hinted that the speed 
by which the Council decides on the public procurement instrument also depended on the country 
taking on the presidency.
A11
 
7.10. Politicized Agenda (HXI-HXIII) 
While for the European parliament insufficient information could be gathered, I did find 
sufficient support for HXI and HXII. There was broad consensus among all interviewees that the 
reciprocity principle and the public procurement instrument had so many political (besides legal 
and technical) sides to it that it would be impossible to have a strictly technical discussion. This is 
also evident from the reviewed arguments of the Northern and Southern group which include 
principled and ideologically laden arguments for or against the instrument. 
Many respondents said that especially with highly controversial issues like the public 
procurement instrument is bound to lead to a lot more discussion and logically takes up more 
time to reconcile the differences.
A1, A3, A6, A8, A10, A11
 Numerous Commission and country 
representatives made the analogy with the politically laden 2005 “made in proposal” or “country 
of origin” proposal,164 which has to this date still not seen its first reading due to continued 
disagreement within the Council, and between the Council and European Parliament. Several 
expected the public procurement instrument to go down that same road.
A8, A11, A12
 As one country 
representative put it, matters on China and trade are so important that there is no way that the 
public procurement instrument or any other policy affecting China can be sneaked through the 
EU back door.
A10
 Member states are bound to jump on the issue. 
 
Table 2. Summary of support for hypotheses 
Hypothesis Commission Council European Parliament 
High agreement threshold I (T) II  III 
High number of veto players IV (T) V VI 
Interest heterogeneity and socialization VII VIII IX (T) 
Supranational decision-making X   
Politicized agenda XI XII XIII 
Bold = accepted, (T) = tentative 
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8. Conclusion 
So did a joint decision-making trap hamper the development of a public procurement instrument 
on third country access? The answer is yes. With the help of Scharpf’s JDT theory, this research 
has uncovered several bottlenecks in the decision-making process of the EU’s common trade 
policy. Although there was not enough evidence to back up all hypotheses, and the proposed 
public procurement instrument still needs to pass through the Council and EP, there was enough 
evidence to conclude that JDT theory can explain why the instrument took six years to be turned 
from an agenda point to an official proposal. 
The public procurement instrument has gone through a lengthy decision-making process 
since it was first suggested by the Commission in 2006. There were both hurdles within the 
Commission and the Council, as well as between the Commission and the Council. There was 
significant disagreement within the Council and the Commission; but while interests have and are 
likely to continue to produce deadlock in the TPC, over time the DGs were able to reconcile their 
differences and devise a joint-proposal hoped to benefit the EU at large. This is in line with the 
expectation of the Commission to function as a supranational agenda setter, which was also 
widely acknowledged by both Commission and Council representatives. Still, even in this role 
the Commission seems unable persuade the other decision-making bodies (Council and EP) to 
support the proposal for a new public procurement instrument. The controversial nature and the 
political implications of the proposal, together with the reservations of member states continues 
to be a serious roadblock. While the high agreement threshold and number of veto-players inside 
the Commission were found to matter less, these two factors were prime influencers inside the 
Council; the combination of 27 self-interested member states and the requirement to pass the 
proposal by QMV prove to be  serious bottlenecks for the instrument. 
The role of the EP has thus far been much more circumspect, and the number of sources 
on which I could test my predictions made the evidence in favor or against the support of the 
hypotheses much more tentative. 
What are the implications for policy makers? This project has first uncovered the 
differences between member states in a more policy-specific domain (public procurement) in 
much greater detail than the ECFR reports. Second, the interviews have uncovered several 
interesting and possibly novel concerns and opinions, which might be of interest to EU officials 
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and country representatives. Third, the research has made a modest contribution to uncovering 
the interactions within the Council’s relatively opaque Trade Policy Committee. These findings 
can hence serve as a guide for policy-makers on how to move this proposal forward, for example 
by finding ways of compromise when the Council and European Parliament commence work on 
the first reading. 
What are the implications for researchers? First, it will be very interesting to continue 
tracking this proposal as it finds its way through the Council and European Parliament. Especially 
the interaction between Council and EP, and the organization of preferences in the EP warrant 
greater research, as this project has been unable to uncover these factors. Second, future research 
could also delve deeper into how the speed of decision-making in the Council moves faster or 
slower depending on the country holding the presidency. Third, this project has shown that 
besides for cases of intra-European policy-making JDT theory is also applicable to (this particular 
case) of decision-making on external trade policy. The author encourages researchers to look for 
other areas and other cases of external policy-making in which the theory might be an effective 
theory for explaining slow decision-making. 
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Appendix – Interviewees 
 
# Who (number of interviewees) Medium When 
A1 Country representatives (2) Interview (2) March 2nd 2012 
June 8th 2012 
A2 DG Trade official E-mail exchange March 19th 2012 
A3 DG MARKT officials (2) Interview May 30th 2012 
A4 DG Trade official Interview May 30th 2012 
A5 INTA official Interview May 31st 2012 
A6 DG Trade official Interview June 1st 2012 
A7 DG Trade official Interview June 1st 2012 
A8 Country representative Interview June 4th 2012 
A9 DG Trade officials (2) Interview June 5th 2012 
A10 DG Trade official Interview  June 6th 2012 
A11 Country representative Interview June 7th 2012 
A12 Country representative Skype interview June 11th 2012 
The majority of the interviews took place in Brussels 
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